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There are four lessons with a potentially general interest which can be learned from the 
employment of temporary foreign workers in Germany during the 1990s. In particular, the 
employment of project-tied workers from Central and Eastern European countries (CEE, e.g. 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) raised political controversy and public debates which, at 
first sight, was out of proportion with the relatively small numbers involved. This specific case 
is thus certainly not representative for the so-called “second generation” of temporary foreign 
worker programmes in Germany. Among the three main categories of temporary foreign 
worker programmes during the 1990s, the highest numbers involved was in the category of 
seasonal worker with consistently more than 200,000 workers. Project-tied work meant the 
employment of about 100,000 foreign workers in the early 1990s in a first period; later 
followed by a sharp increase up to 300,000 annually – however, the workers in the second 
period hailed above all from member states of the European Union (EU). The least important 
in terms of numbers were the programmes for Gastarbeiter. In contrast to the contract worker 
programmes of the 1960s and early 1970s, this category included workers who came to 
Germany for training purposes. Nonetheless, when seen in perspective, the case of project-
tied workers is so instructive because it highlights the problems raised by the employment of 
temporary workers in a fairly highly-regulated labour market. The general argument is that 
densely regulated labour markets function quite differently compared to less regulated 
markets. Four specific propositions speak to and elaborate this general assumption. 
 
 
Proposition No. 1: What seems at first to be a trade-off in the protection of domestic 
vs. the protection of temporary foreign workers points towards institutional (collective 
bargaining) problems in industrial sectors characterized by the strain of 
transnationalization. Nonetheless, the size of the temporary foreign workforce is an 
important intervening variable between the rights of workers and the institutions 
which provide these rights because higher numbers of temporary workers ignite 
disputes over detrimental effects on the domestic workforce. 
Under certain circumstances, there is a perceived trade-off between protection of domestic 
workers and the protection of temporary foreign workers. The size of temporary work force 
plays a crucial intervening role. In other words, it is an intervening variable between the rights 
of both categories of workers. In a highly-regulated labour market, the size of the temporary 
foreign workforce does not matter so much in terms of actual substitution effects but 
regarding its indirect effects on industrial relations. This became very obvious in the case of 
posted workers who were sent by their companies to work in subcontracted work projects in 
Germany during the 1990s. The projects were mainly located in the construction industry, a 
rapidly transnationalizing industrial sector, characterized by many small entrepreneurs. For 
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some years, one of the main trends has been further subcontracting across borders and thus 
an increase in the number and proportion of foreign companies. Within this general context, 
project-tied work was attractive for both general contractors and subcontractors because of, 
first, extraterritorial employment which ensured that the social wages (e.g. social security 
contributions) do not correspond to receiving country standards (e.g. Germany) but to those 
in the countries out of which subcontractors posted their workers abroad (e.g. Poland). 
Therefore, labour costs were considerably lower, up to one third. Also, second, one may 
assume project-tied workers constituted a more docile workforce because of their extra-
territorial status which deprived workers of certain social rights in Germany. 
 
The benefits for employers such as general and subcontractors become even more obvious 
when we compare two periods of the employment of posted workers. In the first period 
workers came in the frame of posted worker arrangements which had been established in 
bilateral agreements between Germany and Central & Eastern European Countries (CEE) 
after the fall of the wall. Their numbers dropped from a high of 100.000 in 1992 to more than 
half after 1993-4 when companies from EU countries began to enter the German market to a 
higher degree. At that time firms mainly from Portugal began to take advantage of the 
freedom of services provision of the internal market. These companies outpaced those from 
CEE countries – among other reasons because they could offer labour at an even cheaper 
price than the CEE companies who had to pay prevailing German wage rates (excluding 
social wages). The EU companies could pay the wages in the country of origin. It took some 
time until the EU attempted to regulate this situation in 1996 by means of a directive 
stipulating that workers from EU countries should basically be employed according to the 
conditions prevalent in the country where the project is fulfilled, i.e. “equal pay for equal work 
at the same place” (cf. Faist 1997: 236). This partly kept in check the downward pressure on 
wages of domestic workers. However, the directive did not halt the growing rate of 
insolvencies among Germany-based small companies. The latter had dominated the market 
before the transnationalization of this sector through the arrival of companies from the CEE 
countries, Portugal and the UK. 
 
While a substitution effect caused by the employment of temporary workers cannot be shown 
to be true, at least for the early 1990s, the consequences for domestic workers were 
nevertheless dire in terms of protection by collective bargaining agreements. By the mid-
1990s employers began to exit the regional construction employers associations. This 
constituted a threat to this sector-specific collective bargaining structure in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. One consequence was that minimum wages were introduced which 
lay below the lowest wages achieved by collective bargaining agreements. Thus, job and 
wage protection for domestic workers is indirectly mediated by the size of the temporary 
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foreign work force. However, the underlying structural factors are the main driving force of 
transnationalizing the construction sector in an area of freedom of services – the common 
market. The increase in subcontracting and the associated use of temporary foreign labour 
only served to underscore this trend. 
 
Nowadays, the protection standards for foreign workers are higher than in the first half of the 
1990s. This applies especially to project-tied workers from EU member states. However, this 
convergence is based on decreasing numbers of foreign workers who are employed as 
project-tied workers in Germany and a trend towards equalizing rights of domestic and 
foreign temporary construction workers, as evidenced by the EU directive. In general, the 
German case in the 1990s suggests that the decreasing size of the temporary workforce is 
inversely related to the de jure (not necessarily de facto) rights protection of temporary 
foreign workers. The crucial mechanism regulating this relationship is the set of institutions 
constituting collective bargaining in a highly regulated labour market, characterized by 
corporatist and tripartite institutions. Although an increasing size of temporary foreign 
workers does not lead to direct substitution effects – as it may in poorly regulated labour 
markets – it challenges weak and crumbling labour market mechanisms under stress by 
transnationalizing markets. The size of the temporary workforce is thus best thought of as an 
‘intervening’ variable, while the transnationalization of the construction sector is akin to an 
‘independent’ set of variables, and the rights of both domestic and foreign temporary workers 
constitute ‘dependent’ variables. 
 
This admittedly very general claim is borne out by a quick look at the temporary foreign 
worker programme with the highest numbers: seasonal workers in agriculture. Agriculture in 
Germany, as in most other western countries, is much less unionised than construction and 
thus also less highly regulated by the ‘social partners’ or by tripartite arrangements. 
According to the proposition advanced it can bear much higher numbers of foreign workers 
with fewer rights. For example, seasonal workers accumulate no social security claims in 
Germany, unless they are employed more than 90 days a year. On average, seasonal 
workers from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland, worked for about 50 days in 
the late 1990s (remarks by Professor Marek Okolski during the workshop). 
 
It is noteworthy that the issue of project-tied workers has taken such a pivotal role in political 
conflicts in the construction sector during the 1990s because it served well to indicate more 
general problems of an industrial sector which has been undergoing radical change. 
Freedom of services in the EU has opened up those sectors where projects have to be built 
on site; e.g. because pre-fabrication in other locations is only partly feasible. One may even 
speak of an instrumentalization of the temporary foreign worker question, i.e. it seemed at 
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times as if project-tied employment is the main cause of the decline of many small-scale 
German construction companies and increasing unemployment among domestic workers. 
This is not necessarily an outgrowth of outright (racist) discrimination. The main construction 
union in Germany (IG Bau) made great efforts to distance itself from foreign worker 
discrimination. Instead, at the root of the sometimes exaggerated impacts of temporary 
foreign worker employment is a very complicated bargaining structure which has come under 
increasing strain. 
 
In sum, temporary foreign worker programmes are particularly contested in highly-regulated 
labour markets because they pinpoint structural problems of labour market institutions 
undergoing change. This also means that labour market institutions with high degrees of 
regulation may have very different ‘needs’ from those in receiving countries with less highly 
regulated institutions. 
 
 
Proposition No. 2: There is a structural tension between the interests of the sending 
countries in optimising the return flow of remittances and knowledge and the 
tendencies in receiving countries to elevate the level of rights enjoyed even by 
temporary migrants (“rights revolution”). This does not mean that sending country 
governments disregard the rights of their expatriates. However, it is a matter of 
emphasis. 
Yet, receiving countries are only one part of the equation. Although the balance of power is 
quite unequal between sending and receiving countries, sending countries have some 
leverage once programmes are instituted. This was especially the case in the bilateral 
treaties between Germany and the CEE countries because these treaties were justified as 
pre-accession arrangements – one among several measures to set CEE countries onto their 
road to full EU accession and membership. Specific reference was made to the so-called 
Europa-Abkommen with these countries. Therefore, it is not surprising to find countries such 
as Poland exerting pressure on the German government to keep up high quotas for the 
admission of project-tied workers and to withstand the demands by the German unions and 
employer associations to drastically cut down on the numbers or eliminate these 
programmes altogether. In short, the Polish government tried to send as many workers 
through subcontracting companies as possible (Stanislawa Golinowska in Faist et al. 1999, 
Appendix A). Again, this very specific issue and instance points to a much broader issue 
involved in temporary foreign worker programmes more generally and probably across the 
globe: sending countries put efforts into maximizing the return of remittances and foreign 
currency, and, if they are optimistic, in the transfer of human capital and other forms of 
knowledge. This is very different from the situation in many receiving countries – at least in 
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Western Europe and North America – where the “rights revolution” of the 1960s (cf. Hollifield 
1992) has increasingly limited the ability of employers to use foreign labour on a very flexible 
basis. 
 
 
Proposition No. 3: At first sight, the treatment of project-tied workers seems to reveal 
an application gap of existing labour standards. Yet it is also evident that the frame of 
reference for many short-term, project-tied workers and their employers is the sending 
country and both formal and informal arrangements regulating labour relations. There 
is a further complicating factor in that much of what is labelled ‘illegal’ arises out of 
the production process itself and thus concerns both domestic and foreign 
(temporary) labour. 
By the mid-1990s, extensive documentation of violation of labour standards concerning 
project-tied workers was available. However, in our interviews at the time we found a striking 
absence of foreign project-tied workers taking their complaints to German labour courts. 
Although they were not covered by German social security law as de-territorialized workers, 
they needed a working permit issued by German authorities, were under German labour 
jurisdiction and thus had recourse to German labour laws. One may be tempted to explain 
this lack of action by their downtrodden status: project-tied workers from countries such as 
Poland did not dare to complain because they feared losing their job. Another answer, 
however, found more support by the empirical evidence uncovered in semi-structured 
interviews: project-tied workers from Central and Eastern European countries actually often 
took a short-term view on their engagement in Germany. Actually, quite a few of them 
circulated between Germany and Poland; repeating project-tied employment or, in some 
cases, switching between project-tied work and irregular and even independent self-
employment and contracting. They populated the German-Polish transnational social space 
(cf. Faist 2003). In general, project-tied workers colluded with employers in “splitting the 
cake”, profiting from the higher wage and benefit levels associated with an engagement in 
Germany. 
 
Informal relations between workers and (sub-) contractors or employers arise out of the 
production process itself and are no specific characteristic of temporary foreign worker 
employment. The construction industry, for example, is characterized by forward integration 
or what is called “tight coupling” (Perrow 1986): in construction sites, one contractor after the 
other has to fulfil contractual obligations within a strict time frame. In case of failure, high 
pecuniary fines are the result. It thus comes as no surprise that sectors such as construction 
(or agriculture, for that matter, albeit for different reasons) are characterized by a relatively 
flexible deployment of labour. Subcontracting foreign companies and thus the use of 
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temporary foreign labour became interesting for contractors especially after German labour 
legislation had formally outlawed illegal subleasing of workers from one employer to another 
(Arbeitnehmerüberlassung) in the late 1970s. When German authorities significantly stepped 
up control of worksites in the early 1990s to fight the illegal use of project-tied workers, the 
inspectors were certainly not able to capture this intrinsic problem of the production process 
itself. 
 
 
Proposition No. 4: A Modest Policy Proposal – International Temporary Worker 
Councils 
A close cooperation between sending and receiving countries would foster the protection of 
both domestic and foreign temporary workers. It is to be kept in mind that although temporary 
foreign labour is used in a very flexible way, more and more newly created jobs in the EU in 
the construction and other sectors are also of a precarious and short-term nature. Therefore, 
cooperation between sending and receiving countries should prove beneficial for both 
domestic and foreign workers – and would not simply be a matter of protecting minority 
groups of workers. Yet conventional wisdom tells us that governmental collaboration in the 
field of (temporary) labour migration field is almost impossible. On the one side, receiving 
countries have no incentive to bargain on temporary worker employment on a collective level 
with sending countries because they are best off in bargaining individually with each potential 
source country. On the other side, sending countries would stand to gain from organizing 
collectively to overcome the asymmetry of power in between senders and receivers. They 
would thus force receiving countries to bargain on a collective level and foster cooperation 
between senders and receivers. In nuce, the senders would form a supplier’s cartel, very 
much like OPEC for the oil-producing countries. However, there are serious obstacles to 
such forms of cooperation. The receiving countries would not be very much affected because 
the prisoner’s dilemma situation among the senders ensures that there is an abundant 
supply of potential sending countries. Sending countries would compete among each other for 
the immigration countries’ most favoured status. Yet even if sending countries agreed on a 
common policy towards the receivers, such as quotas on foreign labour, they would be faced 
with the danger of defection. Partly, this could be overcome by the implementation of 
international rules. However, the problem in this case is not primarily the relatively weak position 
of an enforcing third party, for example, international organizations such as the ILO. The 
‘Migration for Employment Convention’ (1949) and subsequent agreements have exceedingly 
few enforcement mechanisms; certain countries have not even signed it (cf. W.R. Böhning’s 
contribution to the workshop). Instead, it needs to be kept in mind that organizations like ILO are 
concerned with providing a framework for minimum standards, which is – realistically speaking – 
not necessarily in the interests of the senders when it comes to temporary foreign labour (the 
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situation may be different when it comes to settled expatriates). Sending country governments 
might not always and necessarily be among the most vigorous in pushing for such standards. 
To sum up, collective action among the senders as a prerequisite for cooperation between 
senders and receivers is very unlikely and the pay-off matrix is heavily slighted in favour of 
the receiving countries.  
 
The primary problem therefore is to turn temporary foreign labour employment into a 
bargaining game in which parties on both the sending and receiving side might develop an 
interest in at least minimal cooperation. The starting point is the assumption that parties on 
all sides have an interest in the flexible use of temporary foreign labour under conditions of 
minimal standards of protection for both domestic and foreign labour. Cooperation would 
need to rest on a firm institutional foundation. The central pillar would be bilateral or 
preferably international tripartite (states, employers and unions) or even multipartite 
(including NGOs) institutions in which the kind of programmes and other features of 
temporary employment would be negotiated. Such International Temporary Worker Councils, 
modelled along corporatist arrangements and thus best fitting receiving countries with highly 
regulated labour markets, could be established bilaterally between countries such as 
Germany and Poland, or Poland and the Ukraine. Or they could be institutionalised inter- and 
transnationally between the EU and third countries. In such institutionalised arenas, 
collective actors could negotiate over the sort of programmes needed at the moment, the 
quotas of foreign temporary workers involved, and the protections afforded. This would do 
away with the multitude of specialised programmes solely initiated at the receiving side. The 
Councils would be better suited to arrange for short-term policy measures. Also, they could 
react more swiftly to problems of efficiency and protection inevitably arising in the 
implementation and administration of such programmes. One added advantage is that the 
inclusion of multiple actors would be an apt tool to take account of the actual patterns of 
geographical and labour mobility of temporary foreign workers. This could put a lid on 
widespread irregularity much better than increased worksite control (which should not be 
abandoned). But, of course, this would apply to irregularity associated with illegal work or 
residence status; not to irregularity associated with the production process itself. 
 
To close, a crucial caveat is in order. It would be totally unrealistic to expect that such 
collaborative agreements and institutionalisations would function on a global scale. The 
prisoner’s dilemma situation would prevail. At this point in time, the best chances for 
realisation of International Temporary Worker Councils is between the EU and adjoining and 
other third countries because it is only in contexts of ongoing trade and capital exchange and 
contractual agreements covering these sectors that receiving countries have an incentive to 
engage in cooperation with sending countries. Temporary worker employment can thus be 
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only part of a wider array of collaborative measures. The bilateral treaties Germany signed 
with CEE countries are a case in point. As mentioned above, these treaties enabling 
contracting and subcontracting between companies on both sides were justified and 
rationalised as a sort of pre-accession aid of an EU member state towards selected CEE 
countries. This idea could be expanded and institutionalised in the relations between the EU, 
its member states and a host of third countries. 
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